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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§78-2a-3(2)(i).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court's error when it determined, contrary to the

uncontroverted testimony of each of the parties that the purchase price of the peach farm
was $240,000 as opposed to $300,000, this error requires the this Court to vacate the trial
court's findings in their entirety as they relate to the determination of the separate and/or
marital property issues. A trial court's distribution of property may disturbed when the
evidence clearly preponderates against the finding. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373
(Utah App. 1988).
2.

Whether the trial court erred when it determined as a matter of law, and

contrary to the clear weight of evidence, that the sole test for determining whether
separate property merged into the marital estate is whether the donee spouse through her
efforts augmented the value of the property or whether the donor spouse commingled the
separate property with the marital estate. An appellate court reviews a trial court's
application of law for correctness. Mortensen v. Mortensen. 767 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988).
A trial court's distribution of property may be disturbed if the distribution stemsfroma
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial
1

error, the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369,
1373 (Utah App. 1988). Otherwise separate property may become part of the marital
estate when 1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts augmented, maintained, or
protected the property; 2) when the parties have inextricably commingled the property
with the marital estate so that it has lost its separate character; or 3) the owning spouse
has contributed all or part of the property to the marital estate. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d
1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990).
3.

Whether the trial court erred when it determined, in derogation of the clear

weight of evidence, that marital property neither augmented, maintained, nor protected
the value of the peach farm notwithstanding the evidence that approximately one quarter
of the peach farm was financed by the marital estate. An appellate court may disturb a
trial court's distribution of property if the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial
court's finding. Noble, supra, at 1373.
4.

Whether the trial court erred when it determined, in derogation of the clear

weight of the evidence, that the parties did not inextricably commingle the peach farm
with marital property notwithstanding the evidence that approximately one quarter of the
peach farm was financed by the marital estate, that the parties acquired the property
subsequent to the marriage, that during the pendency of the marriage certain parcels of
the peach farm were sold and donated to the marital estate, taxes were paid on the
property from marital assets, and that during the pendency of the marriage the parties'
2

still born child was interred on the peach farm. An appellate court may disturb a trial
court's distribution of property if the evidence clearly preponderates against the finding.
Noble, supra, at 1373.
5.

Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law, and in derogation of the

clear weight of evidence, when it failed to consider whether the Mr. Ballard's actions in
donating contributing all or part of the peach farm to the marital estate deprived the peach
farm of its status as separate property. An appellate court may disturb a trial court's
distribution of property if such distribution stems from a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law. Noble, supra, at 1373.
6.

Whether the trial court erred when it determined, in derogation of the clear

weight of evidence, that the peach farm failed to appreciate in value during the pendency
of the marriage notwithstanding the testimony of Mr. Ballard's own expert witness and
Mr. Ballard's own sworn statements to the contrary. An appellate court may disturb a
trial court's distribution of property if the evidence clearly preponderates against such
finding. Noble, supra, at 1373.
7.

Whether the Court erred in entering itsfindingsof fact that the Plaintiffs

income was $4,000.00 per month. The standard of appellate review is that the trial
court'sfindingof fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Peterson v.
Peterson. 181 P.2d 1305,1307-08 (Utah App. 1991).

3

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Cases:
Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987) In their exercise of discretion, trial
courts need be guided by the general purpose to be achieved by a property division which
is to allocate the property in a manner which best serves the needs of the parties and best
permits them to pursue their separate lives. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
the statutory mandate has conferred broad discretion upon trial courts in the division of
property regardless of the source or time of acquisition. Generally each party shall retain
the separate property brought to the marriage, however, the rule is not invariable. In
fashioning an equitable property division, trial courts need to consider all of the pertinent
circumstances which include, the kind of property to be divided, whether the property
was acquired before or during the marriage; the source of the property; the health of the
parties; the parties standard of living; respective financial conditions; needs and earning
capacity; the duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties ages at
time of marriage and divorce; what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary
relationship the property division has with the amount of alimony and child support to be
awarded.
Burt v.Burt 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1990). Separate property may be considered as
part of the marital estate subject to division when the spouse has by his or her efforts,
augmented, maintained or effected the donated, inherited property; where the property
has been inextricably comingled the property with marital property so that is has lost its
separate character, or where the recipient spouse has contributed all of part of the
property to the marital estate.
Mortensen v. Mortensen. 767 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). The Court should generally
award separate property acquired by one spouse during the marriage to that spouse,
together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value unless (1) the other spouse by
his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection
of that property thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been
consumed or its identify lost through co-mingling or exchanges or where the acquiring
spouse has made a gift of an interest to the other spouse.
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah 1990). Separate property may be
subject to marital division if equitable principals so require.
Barber v.Barber, 792 P.2d 134 (Utah 1990). It is well settled that pre-marital or
separate property may under appropriate circumstances be subject to equitable division
upon divorce.
4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
The dispute in the case before the Court focuses on issues relating to separate and

marital property known by the parties as the peach farm. The Appellant, Jamie R.
Ballard married the Appellee, Brian Ballard in July of 1994, and the Appellant filed for
divorce in early 2001. As set forth above, this appeal presents various issues for the
Court to determine, however, the Court's decision will hinge on 5 issues. First, if the
Trial Court's factualfindingscompletely misstate the uncontroverted evidence must all
conclusion based upon thefindingbe vacated; Second, was the property (the peach farm)
acquired by the parties twenty-two months after their marriage marital or separate
property; Third, if the peach farm was originally separate property, did the parties by
their conduct convert it to marital property; Fourth, did the Court make appropriate
findings as to the division of the separate and or marital property; and Fifth, did the Court
err in determining as a matter of law that once the property was determined to be separate
property that the division not subject to equity. If the Court finds in Appellant's favor on
any of the issues set forth immediately above, the Court should remand this case to the
trial court to make appropriatefindingsunder relevant cases.
B.

Course of Proceeding/Disposition at Trial Court.
On the 29th day of November, 2000, Brian Ballard ("Appellee")filedfor divorce

to dissolve his marriage of approximately 6 years to Jamie Ballard ("Appellant"). The
Court entered an Order on temporary relief after hearing.
5

The case was tried before Judge Lyle R. Anderson in the Seventh Judicial District
Court on in San Juan County on November 13, 14, and 28, 2001. At the close of
testimony on November 28, the Court awarded a Decree of Divorce to Brian Ballard.
Jamie Ballard was awarded the care, custody and control of the parties minor children
subject to visitation pursuant to the statute. Brian Ballard was then ordered to pay child
support in the amount of $756.00 per month for a period of 36 months, at which time the
support shall be recalculated based upon Jamie Ballard's current income, but not less than
$100.00 per month if she is not working.
Brian Ballard was ordered to pay alimony in the amount of $750.00 per month for
a period of 36 months, at which time the alimony was to be reduced to $250.00 for an
additional 36 months.
Each of the parties was ordered to pay one-half of all medical, dental and like
expenses incurred by the minor children, together with one-half of the work related
expenses. Brian Ballard was awarded the income tax exemptions.
Brian Ballard was awarded the peach farm and 13 water shares as his separate premarital property free and clear from any claim of Jamie Ballard. Jamie Ballard was
awarded the marital residence which includes $60,000.00 in equity in the home, and was
ordered to pay the property taxes and insurance incurred in connection with the home.
Brian Ballard was ordered to pay Jamie Ballard a marriage settlement in the
amount of $110,000.00, said amount to be paid within 18 monthsfromNovember 28,
2001 at no interest. Brian Ballard was ordered to assume and discharge the marital
6

obligations, including the obligation on the ranch, improvement lien, the obligations to
Bonneville, Frontier, the tax lien, the obligations on the credit cards up to $7,000.00.
The personal property was divided by the Court. Brian Ballard was also awarded
the assets of Grand Valley Construction Company, the excavation business, together with
all tools, equipment and machinery, including any of those items on the property
belonging to Jamie Ballard's father free and clear of any claim of Jamie Ballard. Brian
Ballard was also awarded the La Sal Ranch property free and clear of any claim of Jamie
Ballard.
The Court found that Brian Ballard's income was $4,000.00 per month. The Court
further found that the temporary support ordered by the Court on March 6, 2000 was
excessive and the Court reduced its temporary orders consistent with alimony and child
support ordered by the decree retroactive to March 6, 2000.
The Court further found that Brian Ballard brought the peach farm to the marriage,
including 13 water shares and that Brian Ballard originally paid $240,000.00frompremarital assets for the peach farm and water shares, and there had been no substantial
increase of value of property; any appreciation of the value of property was through the
market forces. The Court also found the value of the property to be essentially the same
as when purchased.
The property divisions made by the Court were made without any consideration to
the peach farm property, which the Court set aside as separate property not subject to the
Courts equitable powers.
7

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts marshaled supporting and in favor of the Court's decision are as follows:
1.

The parties were married July 4, 1994. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20).

2.

Two children were born as issue of the marriage. At the time of trial each

resided with Jamie Ballard, their ages were 7 and 3. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 20).
3.

Brian Ballard last resided in the marital home in January 6, 2000. (Tr. Vol.

I, p. 21-23).
4.

Brian Ballard claims he brought the farm and the Bar M Chuck Wagon

business into his marriage with Jamie Ballard, and that he sold that property twenty-two
months after he married Jamie Ballard. (Tr. Vol I, p. 203, line 14-16).
5.

Brian Ballard was awarded the farm and the Bar M Chuck Wagon property

from his previous marriage as a result of the bifurcated proceedings on August 18, 1995,
a year an 3 months after having married Jamie Ballard. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 212, lines 1-8).
6.

Brian Ballard claims the value of the farm and Bar M Chuck Wagon

business to the marriage was $240,000.00. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 203, line 18; Plaintiffs Exhibit
1).
7.

During the course of the Ballard's marriage, taxes were paid upon the Bar

M Chuck Wagon business and farm property. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 205).
8.

The farm and Bar M Chuck Wagon property which Brian Ballard claims to

have brought to the marriage was sold on May 20, 1996. Twenty-Two months after
Brian Ballard's marriage to Jamie Ballard. (Tr. Vol.. I, p. 209, lines 1-4).
8

9.

Brian Ballard sold the property which he had received in the previous

divorce proceeding in May of 1996. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 24, line 6).
10.

Brian Ballard valued the peach farm at trial for a total of $300,000.00. He

had previously claimed he purchased the peach farm at $26,000.00 per acre for a total
value of $273,000.00. (Tr. Vol. H, p. 112, line 12).
11.

On Exhibit 24, Brian Ballard valued the 133 acres at La Sal at $300,000.00.

(Tr. Vol. H, p. 42, lines 5-25).
12.

Brian Ballard valued the La Sal Mountain property at the trial in this matter

at $1,300.00 per acre for a total value of $172,900.00. (Tr. Vol I, p. 108, lines 4-5).
13.

The peach farm property purchase by Brian Ballard in 1996 contained

approximately 14 acres. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 44).
14.

There was only IOV2 acres remaining form the 1996 purchase on the farm

property at the date of trial. (Tr. Vol. n, p. 43, lines 4-9).
15.

The farm property was purchased for $300,000.00 in approximately May of

1996. The partiesfinancedthe additional $60,000.00 of the purchase price. (Tr. Vol. n,
p. 184, lines 4-10 and Vol. I, p. 32, line 3).
16.

Of the $60,000.00 which was borrowed, $30,000.00 was repaid from

marital obligations. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 186, line 11-14 and Tr. Vol. I, p. 32 line 5).
17.

During the course of the parties marriage, the parties paid interest payments

on the $60,000.00 debt. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 185-186).
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18.

Brian Ballard's expert witness paid $60,000.00 per acre on property located

in Moab for unimproved property within 2 miles. (Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 82, lines 16-18).
19.

The said property was comparable to the peach farm property. (Tr. Vol. Ill,

20.

The Court stated that Brian Ballard's expert regarding the $60,000.00 and

p. 83).

$40,000.00 values had solid evidence of value. (Tr. Vol. in, p. 80-81, line 2 and line 11).

The remaining facts which do preponderate against the Court's findings are as
follows:
21.

Brian Ballard had been previously married to Lenea Ballard. The previous

marriage relationship ended in the Spring of 1994, however, the property settlement
portion of the case was bifurcated and was not resolved until approximately August of
1995. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 24, line 24 and p. 25, lines 2, 3, 5 and p. 212, lines 6-8).
22.

Brian Ballard used as an exhibit in his bifurcated proceeding a document in

which he valued the farm and Bar M Chuck Wagon business at a net amount of
$112,000.00. (Tr. Vol. H, p. 13, lines 15-20, Exhibit 22).
23.

In the bifurcated proceeding (Exhibit 22), Brian Ballard urged division of

the at a net value of $112,000.00. (Tr. Vol. H, p. 15).
24.

Other than equipment valued at approximately $2,000.00 the farm and

chuck wagon property was the only property Brian Ballard tookfromhis previous
marriage. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 15, lines 14-22).
10

25.

The exhibit in which Brian Ballard valued the property in the previous

divorce for a net of $112,000.00 was created by Brian Ballard's attorney. (Tr. Vol. II, p.
16).
26.

Brian Ballard's ex-wife from the previous marriage received approximately

equal amounts of money to the value $140,000.00 received by Brian Ballard. (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 26, lines 17-20).
27.

Brian Ballard was ordered to pay $17,000.00 of debts from his previous

marriage. Those debts remained after the Ballard marriage. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 19, lines 2124).
28.

Brian Ballard believes that he brought $240,000.00 worth of property to the

Ballard marriage. (Tr. Vol. H, p. 20, lines 7-10).
29.

The property which Brian Ballard claims was pre-marital property was

acquired 22 months after Brian Ballard married Jamie Ballard. (Tr. Vol. n, p. 23, lines
11-13).
30.

The Ballards agreed that their residence has value of $220,000.00. (Tr.

Vol.. H, p. 27).
31.

On April 30, 1999, Brian Ballard filed documents with the State of Utah to

obtain a higher bid limit for his contractors license in which he testified that he valued his
assets for more man they were really worth. (Tr. Vol. JJ, p. 29, Exhibit 24).
32.

In the document submitted to the State of Utah (Exhibit 24) Brian Ballard

estimated his assets as of December 31,1999 of $1,236,000.00. Brian Ballard testified
11

that he did not believe the value set forth in Exhibit 24 was justified. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 31,
lines 13-15).
33.

Brian Ballard testified that getting a high bid limit with the State of Utah

justified submitting financial information to the State of Utah that knowingly inflated
values. (Tr. Vol.. H, p. 32, lines 10-12).
34.

Brian Ballard admitted that on several occasions he had falsely valued

assets to justify the outcome he wanted. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 32, lines 18-24).
35.

The Court stated that it could not put much stock in what Brian Ballard said

a piece of property was worth. (Tr. Vol. n, p. 37, lines 2-8).
36.

In Exhibit 24, Brian Ballard admitted that he listed the value of the parties

personal residence at $220,000.00. (Tr. Vol. n, p. 40-41, lines 16-25 and 1-4).
37.

Exhibit 24, which Brian Ballard testified inaccurately valued the peach

farm included a value of $440,000.00 dollars. (Tr. Vol. H, p. 41, lines 13-15).
38.

During the course of the parties marriage, approximately 6 lots were sold

for between $25,000.00 and $37,000.00, including 1/3 acre lots were sold from the
property acquired by Brian Ballard in 1996. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 46).
39.

The parties used proceedsfromthe sale of the peach farm for payment of

marital obligations. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 54, lines 15-25).
40.

Brian Ballard valued the equipment purchased from Eldon Ray (in Exhibit

24) in hisfinancialstatement to the State of Utah at $210,000.00. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 57).

12

41.

Brian Ballard did not file personal tax returns with the Internal Revenue

Service in years, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 57-61).
42.

The Eldon Ray Construction business was purchased by Brian Ballard on

February 1, 1997 for $220,000.00. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 83).
43.

The Eldon Ray business in part was financed by a lien upon the parties

residence. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 79, line 1, and p. 83, line 25).
44.

The parties built their personal house on property carved out of the peach

farm property purchased in 1996. Brian Ballard paid real property taxes on the peach
farm during the course of their marriage. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 74, lines 1-4).
45.

The parties jointly raised fruit on the property and kept the money as joint.

(Tr. Vol. n, p. 79).
46.

During the course of the parties marriage, Jamie Ballard gave birth to a still

bom child. (Tr. Vol. H, p. 79, line 21).
47.

The still bom child's body was buried on the peach farm. (Tr. Vol. n, p.

79, line 21-23 and p. 80, line 5-6).
48.

The parties purchased approximately 160 acres of the La Sal Mountain

property for $180,000.00. (Tr. Vol. H, p. 87, line 17).
49.

Shortly after the purchase of the La Sal Mountain property, the parties sold

various lots for an average of $2,500.00 per acre. (Tr. Vol. n, p. 87, line 25).
50.

Brian Ballard used the proceedsfromthe sale of portions of the peach farm

property for payment of marital obligations. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 90, lines 1-3).
13

51.

The proceeds from the sale of the peach farm parcels was virtually the only

marital income during the year 1998. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 90, lines 5-9).
52.

The peach farm property was appraised by Brian Ballard's first expert at

$26,000.00 per acre. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 112, lines 9-13).
53.

The appraisal was for a lump sump of piece of property rather than for

individual lots. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 113, lines 1-6).
54.

The peach farm would have had a higher value had it been appraised as if it

were to be subdivided. (Tr. Vol. n, p. 114, lines 11-14).
55.

Brian Ballard's first appraisal did not take in to account other sales of 1/3

acre lots which had been carved out of the property. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 114).
56.

The parties also used the farm property to collateralize additional marital

obligations including for payment of a pick-up truck for Brian Ballard. (Tr. Vol. II, p.
188, lines 2-7).
57.

The parties lived in a second house which they constructed upon the peach

farm for a period of 14 months. (Tr. Vol. n, p. 192, lines 2-8 and Vol. Ill, p. 48, lines 1325).
58.

The parties used a portion of the peach farm property for the purchase of

the La Sal Mountain property by trading 1 lot for part of the purchase price. (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 44, lines 16-17 and Vol. H. p. 47, line 19 and 22-23).
59.

Jamie Ballard brought $67,000.00 of premarital assets to the parties

marriage which were used. (Tr. Vol. n, p. 210).
14

60.

A value of $32,000.00 for a 1/3 acre lot was ascribed to the trade for the La

Sal Mountain property. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 210, line 20-23).
61.

The money used to renovate the home in which the parties lived came from

the water shares which were purchased with the peach farm property in 1996. (Tr. Vol.
ffl, p. 48).
62.

Jamie Ballard assisted in pouring the foundation for the cement for the

edifice which the parties constructed on the farm property in which to live. (Tr. Vol. Ill,
p. 49).
63.

Jamie Ballard sold a lot which she received from her father for $27,000.00.

The proceeds were used for the purchase of the La Sal Mountain ranch property. (Tr.
Vol. HI, p. 50).
64.

The proceedsfromthe sale of the peach farm were used for household

purposes, including paying joint debt. (Tr. Vol. HI, p. 50).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Trial Court found that
Brian Ballard had brought certain real property known as the peach farm to the marriage,
and that Brian Ballard had kept the property solely in his name except for those portions
which were sold or traded. The Court ruled that the peach farm was not comingled.
The Court further found that Brian Ballard had paid $240,000.00 from assets for
the peach farm and the water shares and that there was no substantial increase in the
15

value of the property and that any depreciation of the value of the property was due to
market forces, and that the present value of the farm at the time of the trial was the same
as when purchased when reduced by the outstanding debt owing. The Court also found
that Jamie Ballard had made no significant contribution to the farm which resulted in an
enhancement of value, that she had not made sufficient effort on her part to increase the
value of the farm.
The Courts finding of those facts was clearly erroneous on its face in that Brian
Ballard did not pay $240,000.00 as found by the Court. Rather, as the transcript clearly
shows, the purchase price of the property was $300,000.00 of which $60,000.00 was
financed by the parties. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 184, lines 4-10 and Vol L, p. 32, line 3). The
debt was incurred as purchase money debt and was incurred during the course of the
parties marriage.
Because the basic premise of the Courts finding was a purchase price of
$240,000.00 without financing all conclusions revolving around this finding must be
vacated.
The Court's determination that the property was separate and not marital property
further failed to consider the parties usage of the property to determine if separate
property had become marital property based upon the parties conduct. The Court did not
entertain that analysis. Notwithstanding evidence supporting that conclusion. Brian
Ballard for example, admitted repeatedly at the trial that the proceeds from the sales of
portions of the peach farm property he claimed were used for the support and
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maintenance of the family unit, and in one year virtually his only income wasfromthe
sale of the peach farm parcels. In addition to the use of the property for supporting the
marital estate, the parties buried their still bom child on the property. The conduct and
uses of the property manifests clear intent by the parties that it was to be their marital
property.
Even if the property had been separate property as determined by the Court, the
Court did not apply the principles of exception as set out in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988), or the equitable principals demanded by Burt v. Burt, 799
P.2d 1166, 1169, (Utah App. 1990) in dividing the property.
Even if the Court had applied the principles of Mortensen and Burt, the evidential
ruling would manifest an abuse of discretion because the evidence simply does not
warrant such a finding.

ARGUMENT
L
THE COURTS FINDING AS TO THE PURCHASE PRICE OF
THE PEACH FARM IGNORE THE UNCONTROVERTED
TESTIMONY OF EACH OF THE PARTIES TO THE LITIGATION
A trial court is required to make findings on all material issues; Throckmorton v.
Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and the trial court must support
its decision with adequate findings. Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
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Section 13(B) of the Courts findings of fact states as follows:
The Petitioner originally paid $240,000.00 from premarital
assets for the farm and water share and there has been no
substantial increase in the value of the property; any
appreciation in the value is due to market forces; the present
value of the farm is essentially the same as when purchased
when reduced by the outstanding debt owing there on and the
parcels sold.
Thefindingof the Court is not supported by the record, and is contradicted by the
direct testimony of both Brian Ballard and Jamie Ballard.
Brian Ballard testified regarding the purchase price of the peach farm property as
follows:
"I paid $300,000.00 total for the farm. That included the
water shares and everything. And so we ~ I had to borrow
that $60,000.00 and I have borrowing (sic) that over since."
(Tr. Vol. I. p. 32, lines 3-6).

Jamie Ballard testified as to the purchase of the peach farm property as follows:
Question:
Answer:
Question:
Answer:
Question:
Answer:

Okay. And he purchased that property for
$300,000.00 is that correct?
That's correct.
Ah. He testified before that he put $240,000.00
down.
That's, I guess that - yeah. I guess he did.
Where did the other $60,000.00 come from?
We borrowed thatfromfriends.

The plain, uncontroverted, and only evidence concerning the purchase price of the
peach farm flies in the face of the Courts findings. Thefindingof the purchase price of
$240,000.00 is not supported by any evidence in the record.
18

The effect of theflawedfindingson the Courts decision below must necessarily be
fatal The Courtsfindingsas to the purchase price is the foundation for its decision to
treat the peach farm as separate property.
If the Court had been cognizant of the actual purchase price of the property, that
roughly one-quarter of the purchase price had been borrowed during the course of the
marriage and paid on with marital property at the very least, only part of the property
could have been separate property. Without correct and adequatefindingson the
purchase price and debt issue it is not legally possible to correctly conclude that any part
of the property is separate.

IL
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PEACH FARM WAS SEPARATE PROPERTY,
When Brian and Jamie Ballard married in July of 1994, Brian Ballard had no
assets to his name except a claim for a portion of marital property from a bifurcated
divorce proceeding. Brian Ballard's claim did not become a reality until an order was
rendered determining his property interest approximately 15 months after his marriage to
Ms. Ballard. Mr. Ballard in that previous divorce proceeding argued that the property
had a net value of approximately $112,000.00. (See Exhibit 22). Apparently in his
divorcefromLenea he wanted to value low but thereafter when he purchased the peach
farm from the Ballard Family he wanted the value higher. Mr. Ballard sold the property
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he received from the previous marriage for $240,000.00. The approximate $128,000.00
dollar difference in what he valued the property in the divorce and that which he sold it
for apparently occurred over a period of approximately seven months. The peach farm
was acquired approximately 22 months after the parties had been married, and was
acquired for $300,000.00, $240,000.00 of which was paid in cash with the balance
financed.
To withstand an appeal the Trial Court must make sufficient findings to justify its
decision to award property as separate or married property. Burt v. Burt, (supra). Also
see Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988), and Naranjo v.
Naranjo. 751 P.2d 1144,1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In the face of the uncontroverted evidence that the property was purchased for
$300,000.00, with $60,000.00 of marital debt, the Courts findings cannot support its
ultimate conclusion as to separate property.
The Court did not makefindingsas to the effect on the separate property of it
having been acquired by Brian Ballard some twenty-two months after his marriage to
Jamie Ballard. Where the parties use marital funds to maintain and augment the assets,
the appreciated portion of the assets, if not the assets itself are the marital property. See
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1169, and also Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. 875 P.2d 598 (Utah
App. 1994).
The record is replete with the Courts observations that where the property is
separate appreciation is immaterial and irrelevant. Because of that position it was easy to
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ignore evidence provided by Mr. Ballard's own witness that comparable property had
sold for between $40,000.00 to $60,000.00. (Tr. Vol. in, p. 80-81, line 2 and line 11).
The Court failed to even consider the appreciation of the asset as a result of its
flawed finding of separate property.
If the Court would have considered the possibility that at least the appreciation to
the property was a marital asset as appears contemplated by Burt and Schaumberg (supra)
an additional $252,000.00 in appreciation alone could have been potentially available for
division by the Court.1
While there are a plethora of Utah cases discussing how the marital and separate
property should be treated, there have not been any Utah cases that actually have clearly
defined how to determine if an asset is marital or separate property. Where the property
in the matter before this Court wasn't acquired until twenty-two months after the parties
marriage, and was partlyfinancedby the parties, it seems reasonable that the only
separate property to which Brian Ballard should be allowed is the $112,000.00 he took
from his previous marriage. In that case in addition to the appreciation discussed herein
an additional $167,000.00 of marital property would be available for distribution.

$252,000.00 is derivedfromtaking the difference from Brian's first
appraiser of $10.5 acres at $26,000.00 and Brian's second expert at 10.5 x
the mean of $40,000.00 and $50,000.00.
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III.
EVEN IF THE PROPERTY WAS SEPARATE PROPERTY
IT BECAME MARITAL PROPERTY BY ITS USE
DURING THE COURSE OF THE MARRIAGE.
It is well settled that property, otherwise classifiable as separate property, may
become part of the marital estate when (1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts
augmented, maintained or protected the property; (2) when the parties have inextricably
comingled the property with marital property so that its loss is separate character; or (3)
^ e owning spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital estate. Burt
v.BurL 799 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah App. 1990), Hallv.HalL 558 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah
App. 1993); Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. 875 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1994).
In the matter before the Court, the Trial Court found that Jamie Ballard had not
augmented or maintained the property and that the property was not comingled and
simply ignored the evidence that Brian Ballard had contributed all or part of the property
to the marital estate. It is clearly within the Trial Court's province to accept Brian
Ballard's testimony that Jamie Ballard did not actually work on the farm.
It is the Trial Court's duty as the trier of fact to test the credibility of the evidence
and decide the facts. However, the Trial Courts narrow focus on only that which Jamie
actually contributed to the peach farm is in the words of the Court of Appeals in Dunn v.
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, (Utah App. 1990).
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'troublesome as it suggests a weighing only of each parties
financial contribution to marriage." "such an analysis ignores
contributions of love, encouragement, companionship which
elude monetary evaluation." It also gives short shrift to
spouses who contribute homemaking skills and child care."
The Court's narrowfindingas to who actually worked on the property ignores other
contributions to the marriage. The Court should have also considered those other
contributions made by Jamie Ballard to the marital estate, See Dunn, supra.
The Court'sfindingthat the property was not comingled was apparently based
upon the narrow fact that the legal title was always in the name of Brian Ballard. The
findingfliesin the face of the parties using the property as the financial foundation of
their marriage.
The co-mingling started with the purchase of the peach farm 22 months into the
marriage. Brian Ballard stated: "we - I borrowed the remaining $60,000.00." (Tr. Vol.
p.

line ). The statement speaks volumes on several levels. In all likelihood, the

property could not have been purchased at all but for the post marriage marital
borrowing. If one were cynical (isn't cynicism required or at least permitted where the
party has admitted to on numerous occasions tofilingfalsefinancialinformation to suit
his purposes, and hadn't filed income tax returns for the 5 years prior to the divorce) the
64

we"firstused by Brian Ballard in his testimony could even ben taken seriously to mean

he and his wife to whom he had been married to for twenty-two months.
It was comingled when the parties first constructed from their own hands and
resided in the fruit shed on the property and thereafter sold the property upon which the
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fruit shed was constructed and used that sale for their marital support.
It was comingled when the parties traded part of the property for the La Sal
Mountain property and encumbered it for the purpose of financing that acquisition.
It was comingled when an additional five parcels of the property were sold to
support the family and the marital estate. It was comingled when Brian and Jamie
interred their still born child in a homemade coffin built with Brian's hands on the
property.
It was comingled when the parties paid real estate taxes from marital assets on the
property.
It was comingled when the parties paid interest and principal payments on the
marital purchase money debt.
The Court failed to make findings and in fact ignored the evidence that Brian
Ballard had in fact contributed all or part of the property to the marital estate. The
foregoing facts can lead to no other conclusion than Brian Ballard contributed the
property to the marital estate. The parties in their conduct openly and notoriously used
the property as their marital financial foundation. The Court's failure to make findings in
light of the overwhelming evidence of contribution is an abuse of discretion. The Court
of Appeals in Noble (supra) on similar facts required afindingthat those acts did add up
to contribution of the property to the martial estate. The Trial Court'sfindingsof fact
with relation to the peach farm are found in their entirety at paragraph 13 of the Court's
finding. That paragraphs states:
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The Courtfindsthat the Petitioner brought certain real property into
the marriage, which property is referred to as the farm or peach farm,
together with 13 water shares. With relation to such property, the Court
finds:
A.
That the funds used to purchase the farm are traceable
from Petitioner's previous marriage settlement; Petitioner has
kept the property solely in his name, except for those parcels
which were sold or traded, the proceeds of which were
comingled; the remaining property known as the peach farm
has not been comingled;
B.
The Petitioner originally paid $240,000 from
premarital assets for the farm and water shares and there has
been no substantial increase in the value of the property; any
appreciation in the value of the property is due to market
forces; the present value of the farm is essentially the same as
when purchased when reduced by the outstanding debt owing
thereon and the parcels sold.
C.
The Respondent has made no significant contribution
to the farm which has resulted in any enhancement of value;
D.
The documentation or evidence presented by
Respondent does not reflect sufficient effort on her part so as
to cause an increase in the value of the property;
E.
The Court believed the testimony of the water master
and the receipts for the purchase of the trees and this evidence
did not support Respondent's claim to have contributed
significant effort on the farm;
F.

The peach farm and water shares described as:
City of Moab County of Grand all of PLAT A
& B, BALLARD SUBDIVISION
Are Petitioner's premarital property and should
not be included as marital assets:
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G.
Petitioner is obligated to pay the debt owing on the
peach farm as premarital debt.
Given the body of evidence to the contrary, the failure to make findings on all
material issues raised by the evidence is error and an abuse of discretion.

EVEN IF SEPARATE PROPERTY. THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS
THE EQUITABLE ISSUES RELATING TO THE PROPERTY,
The Utah Supreme Court in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988)
stated as follows:
'"we concluded that in Utah, trial courts making equitable
property division pursuant to Section 30-3-5 should in
accordance with the prevailing rule in most other jurisdiction
and with the division made of our own in cases generally
award property acquired by one spouse by gift, inheritance
during the marriage, 'or property acquired in exchange
thereof that spouse together with any appreciation or
enhancement of its value unless . . . "
From Mortensen the question then becomes what does "general" and "unless"
mean in the context of Brian and Jamie Ballard.
In Mortensen the effect of the words were general and unless permitted the Trial
Court to divide marital property unequally because of the separate property issue, thus
subjecting the separate property to the Court's equitable power and in essence awarding
some separate property to the spouse which had no direct legal interest.
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The Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have steered clear of a rule requiring a
sterile application requiring a quick and dirty separate property determination from which
all other property distributions must follow.
If the Court below had avoided its rigid analysis and considered equity it could
have considered that Jamie Ballard brought $67,000.00 of value to the marriage, Brian
Ballard originally brought nothing. Fifteen months after the marriage Brian Ballard
received property that he personally placed a net value on at $112,000.00. Jamie Ballard
without hesitation used all of her assets to benefit the marital estate. In addition, she bore
the parties two children, handled the domestic duties and was then told by her husband
she didn't do enough on the peach orchard to be a full partner.
Brian Ballard on the other hand, either by design or mere accident put one piece of
property in his name and then came to the Court and says, what's mine is mine and what
hers is ours. The manifest effect of such conduct is not equitable and just not fair.
In Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987), the Supreme Court held: when a
decree of divorce is made, the Court may make such orders in relation to the . . . property
. . . of the parties . . . as may be equitable. This Court has followed that principle on
numerous occasions and has consistently concluded that Trial Court's have broad
discretion in the division of property regardless of its source or time of acquisition. In the
exercise of their discretion, trial courts must be guided by the general purpose to be
achieved by a property division which is to allocate the property in a manner which best
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serves the needs of the parties, and best permits them to pursue their separate lives. Reed
v. Reed. 594 P.2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979).
In Burke, the Supreme Court further held:
premarital property gifts inheritances may be viewed as
separate property, and in appropriate circumstances equity
will require that each party retain the separate party brought
to the marriage . . . however the rule is not invariable. In
fashioning an equitable property division, trial courts need to
consider all of the pertinent circumstances . . . the factors
generally to be considered by the amount and kind of property
to be divided whether the property was acquired before or
during the marriage the source of the property; the health of
the parties; the parties standard of living; respective financial
conditions; the needs and earning capacity; the duration of the
marriage; the children of the parties; the parties ages at time
of marriage and of divorce; what the parties gave up by the
marriage; and the necessary relationship the property division
has with alimony and child support to be awarded
"
With the exception of the source of the property, the Court utterly failed to
consider those personal circumstances which Burke said should be considered. In
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe. 804 P.2d 530 (Utah 1990) the Court of Appeals consistent
with Mortensen and Burt held as follows:
"however, in making equitable orders pursuant to Section 330-5 the Court has consistently concluded that the trial court
is given broad discretion in dividing property regardless of its
source or time of acquisition."
Osguthorpe. Mortensen. and Burt, require deviation from the basic rule if equitable
principles so require." The cases in Utah set forth above simply do not permit a trial
court to make a determination of separate property and divide the property without
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following the Appellate Court's guidelines to consider all of the factors contemplated by
equity.
The Court of Appeals in Moon v. Moon. 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990) for all
practical purposes held that under circumstances similar (with regard to the financing of
the property) that the appreciation is marital property.
In the matter before the Court, the Trial Court held that because of itsfindingon
the separate property issue, appreciation need not be seriously considered. While the
Court did make a finding that the property had not appreciated, the finding was not
supported by evidence provided by Brian Ballard's own expert that in fact the property
had appreciated.
The evidence on appreciation requires a careful analysis of the testimony of both
witnesses called by Brian Ballard to establish the value of the peach orchard.
The first witness, Valle Smouse testified that the property was worth $26,000 per
acre. The value was based upon its present configuration as one large piece. (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 112, lines 9-25). That appraisal did not consider that portions of the original peach
orchard had been sold in 1/3 acre parcels for $25,000.00 to $37,000.00.
Valle Smouse also testified that if the property had been appraised as a
subdivision, the value would have been higher. (Vol. Tr. II, p. 114, line 114). The
appraiser also had not been told by Brian Ballard the amount for which the other lots had
been sold, (supra)
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Brian Ballard's second witness that testified as to the value of the peach orchard
was Tom Shellenberger. Mr. Shellenberger was apparently called to testify with regard to
the development possibilities for the peach orchard. With regard to development, the
testimony was largely aborted for foundational reasons. (Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 75-77).
Mr. Shellenberger did testify though that he was personally aware of comparable
pieces of property selling for between $40,000.00 and $60,000.00 per acre. In fact he
had paid $60,000.00 per acre for comparable property. (Tr. Vol. in, p. 82-83, lines 1625) and 1-11).
The Courts inappropriately narrow focus on separate property prevented an
analysis of appreciation, equity and fair play.

V,
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT BRIAN BALLARD
EARNED $4,000.00 PER MONTH
The Court's task below regarding Mr. Ballard's earning capacity was not enviable.
An analysis of the evidence demonstrates that any conclusion to which the Court came
would have some relation to pulling a rabbit out of hat. Mr. Ballard testified that his
income was $5,000.00 annually. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 76, line 8). Mr. Ballard's accountants
testified that Mr. Ballard's income was $28,000.00 annually. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 150, line 13),
but stated that the information was only as good as that provided to him by Brian Ballard.
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Given Brian Ballard's track record, any reliance upon his testimony with regard to
property value or income is not warranted.
Brian Ballard testified that he had falsely inflated his assets to obtain a higher
contractor's license limitfromthe State of Utah. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 32, lines 10-12). He
testified that he had on multiple occasions placed values on assets in a manner which met
his personal needs, rather than with a regard to honest value. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 37, lines 28). Brian Ballard testified that he had on credit applications inflated his income to obtain
credit. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 32, line 23-25).
Testimony of a witness who without hesitation admits to widespread and
prevailing dishonesty on the topic should be ignored. In fact the Court itself stated that it
could not place much stock in Ballard's testimony. (Tr. Vol. n, p. 37, line 2-8).
On the other hand, Jamie Ballard testified that her estimates of income were based
upon her experience with regard to family expenses. (Tr. Vol. HI, p. 8-9, line 7-9).
Given that the parties mortgage payment with insurance and interest was
approximately $1,800.00 per month, a conclusion that Mr. Ballard's income was
$4,000.00 per month cannot be warranted.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Trial Court's order with regard to separate
marital property and the division thereof, and the income of the Petitioner Brian Ballard
should be vacated. The Court's erroneousfindingregarding the purchase price of the
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peach farm is the keystone upon which all other property findings and conclusions are
based. Because the keystone of the Trial Court's decision is so fatally flawed, all other
conclusions flowing therefrom with regard to marital and separate property and their
division must collapse.
The Court's finding with regard to Mr. Ballard's income, while admittedly a
valiant effort under the circumstances cannot stand in the light of Mr. Ballard's plain
unvarnished and apparently unblushing statements that he manipulates the facts to suit his
purposes as necessary.

/

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this _Z

day of November, 2002.

BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE, P.C.

David O. Black
Attorney for Respondent, Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN R, BALLARD,
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.
JAMIE R. BALLARD,

Civil No. 0047-136

Respondent.

THIS MATTER came before the Court for hearing on the 13 u \
14rh and 28ch days of November, 2001.

The Petitioner was present

in person and represented by counsel, Craig C. Halls,

The

Respondent was present in person and represented by counsel,
David O. Black.

The Court heard testimony of the parties and

various witnesses and reviewed evidence as provided by the
parties and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

X

1.

Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce, severing the

bonds of matrimony existing between the parties to become final
immediately upon entry of the same in the registry of actions,
2.

Respondent is awarded the care, custody and control of

the minor children, subject to Petitioner's right of visitation
pursuant to U.C.A. §30-3-35.5 for children under 5 and u.c.A.
§30-3-35, et seq> for children over 5 years of age3.

Petitioner is ordered to pay child support in the amount

of $756 per month for a period of 36 months, at which time the
support shall be recalculated based upon Respondent's current
income, being not lees than $1000 per month if she is not
working.
4.

Petitioner is ordered to pay alimony in the amount of

$750 per month for a period of 36 months, at which time the
alimony shall be reduced to $250 per month for an additional 36
months.

Alimony in any amount shall cease at such time as the

Respondent remarries, cohabitates or dies, pursuant to U,C.A.
§30-3-3.5(8-9).
5.

The parties are ordered to pay one-half of all medical,

dental and like expenses incurred on behalf of the minor
children.

2

6.

The parties are ordered to pay one-half of all work or

school related child care expenses.
7.

Petitioner is awarded the income tax exemptions for the

minor children,
8.

The Petitioner is awarded the peach farm property and 13

water shares as his premarital property, free and clear from any
claim of the Respondent, said property is more particularly
described as:
City of Moab County of Grand all of PLAT A & B,
BALLARD SUBDIVISION

9.

The Respondent is awarded the marital residence, which

includes $60,000 in equity in the home, and should be ordered to
pay the property tax and insurance incurred in connection with
the home.

At such time as the marriage settlement set forth

below is paid in full, the Respondent shall also be responsible
for making the house payment.
10.

The Petitioner is ordered to pay to Respondent a

marriage settlement in the amount of $110,000; said amount is to
be paid within 18 months from November 28, 2001, at no interest.
11.

Petitioner is ordered to pay the house payment until

such time as the marriage settlement is paid in full.

3

Petitioner

jshall be entitled to reduce the marriage settlement by the
Iprincipal portion of each house payment made,
I

i

j

12. The Petitioner is ordered to assume and discharge the

jmarital obligations co-wit: the obligation on the ranch, the
I improvement lien, the obligations to Bonneville, Frontier, the
I tax lien, the obligations on the credit cards up to $7,000 and
i

]the Eldon Ray Judgment.
j
13. The pexeonal property of the parties shall be divided
I
\as follows:
\

A. Petitioner shall receive the following:

«

I
1

Freezer
Chopping block

1

Pizza oven

j
!
i
]
|
l
j
]
]
t

Steak fryer
Fruit scales
Chief Joseph and Icabod Crane paintings
Ballard Farms Egg carton
Porter Rockwell painting
Two dutch oven
One-half of antique farm equipment
Blue tractor
Antique wagon
Oak table

n

|
j
?
|
i
]
|

Michael's gun cabinet
.22 r i f l e and shotgun
Petitioner's photographs
All construction tools
Antique license plate collection
Lantern
Pickup truck

B.

The Respondent shall receive the following:
Home
One-half of antique farm equipment
Household furniture and furnishings acquired
during the marriage
Ford Explorer
4-wheeler
Camp Chef burner

14.

The Petitioner is awarded all of the assets of Grand

Valley Construction and the excavation business, together with
fall tools, equipment and machinery, and including any of those
) items which are on the property of Respondent's father, free and

I

\ clear of any claim of the Respondent.

I

]

15.

The Petitioner is awarded the ranch property free and

t
i

i clear of any claim of the Respondent, which property is more
J

jparticularly described as follows:
t

T28S, R25E, SLBM
Section 10: B%EJ$E«SE}<
Section ll:WKNW^SWMSE^;SEMSW^;VRiSW^
Section 14:NKRBUNW3a9WM;N3fl93iNB^NH3i

Excepting therefrom an undivided a interest in all oil,
gas, and other minerals. Subject to all restrictions,
easements, and Rights-of-Way, however evidenced
16.

Neither party is awarded attorney's fees, except

Respondent has incurred attorney fees in the amount of $12,500.00
to Black, Stith & Argyle and $4826.00 to Randall L. Skeen, which
j amounts shall be paid by Petitioner to Respondent's counsel

respectively out of the payments required to be made by
Petitioner to Respondent pursuant to paragraph 10 above.
17.

Each of the parties is ordered to facilitate the

transfer of title to the various properties or to remove any
encumbrances or liens either has placed upon any of the property
including the property sold to Dan Holyoak.
1
DATED this /#fcl day of January, 2002-

CRAIG C, HALLS #1317
Attorney for Petitioner
333 South Main Street
Blandingr, Utah 84511
Telephone: 678-3333

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVQSTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN R. BALLARD.
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs,
JAMIE R. BALLARD,

Civil No. 0047-136

Respondent.
THIS MATTER came before the Court for hearing on the 13th,
14th and 28tb days of November, 2001. The Petitioner was present
in person and represented by counsel, Craig C. Halls. The
Respondent was present in person and represented by counsel,
David O. Black.

The Court heard testimony of the parties and

various witnesses and reviewed evidence as provided by the
parties.

Therefore, being fully advised in the premises, now

makes and enters its

1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1*

The Court finds that the parties are residents of Grand

County, State of Utah, and were for a period In excess

of three

months immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

The Court finds that: the Respondent is a fit and proper

person to have the care, custody and control of the minor
children awarded to her, subject to Petitioner's right of
visitation pursuant to the statutory guidelines as a minimum.
3.

The parties have been separated for a period in

excess

of one year, have differences with regard to finances, discipline
of stepchildren and other matters and there is no chance of
reconciliation.
4.

The Court finds that for the purpose of child support

the income of the Petitioner is §4000 per month and the income of
Respondent is zero.

Petitioner is currently paying child support

for other children and the income available for the payment of
child support in this action is $3167.00 per month.
5.

The Court finds if the Respondent is not working on

December 1, 2004, her income shall then be imputed at $1000 per
month or if she is working then her current income shall be used
in recalculating child support, not less than minimum wage.
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€.

The Court finds that the Petitioner should be ordered to

pay child support in the amount of $756 per month for both
children for a period of 36 months, beginning November, 2001, at
which time the support shall be recalculated as set forth above.
7.

The Court finds that the Respondent has the following

monthly expenses: groceries, $325; electricity, $80; gas, $100;
clothing, $100; transportation, $200; telephone, $50; property
tax $150; insurance, $40.
8.

The Court finds Respondent needs $1250 per month to meet

her necessary expenses•
9.

The Court finds that based upon the income and expenses

of the parties, the Petitioner should be ordered to pay spousal
support in the amount of $750.00 per month for a period of 36
months at which time the alimony shall be reduced to $250 per
month for an additional 36 months. Alimony in any amount shall
cease at such time as the Respondent remarries, co-habitates or
dies, pursuant to U.C.A. §30-3-3.5(8-9).
10.

The Court finds that the temporary support as ordered

by this Court on March 6, 2001, is excessive and the child and
spousal support as ordered herein shall be retroactive to March
6, 2001. Thus, the child support obligation from March, 2001,
through October, 2001v should have been $6048.00; the spousal
3

support for the period of March through October, 2001 should have
been $6000, for a total of $12,048.00.

Any arrearage of child

and spousal support shall be limited to the difference of the
amount paid by Petitioner and $12,048.00.
11.

The Court finds that neither of the parties has

insurance available through employment and each should pay onehalf of all out of pocket expenses

on behalf of the minor

children for medical and dental care.
12-

Each of the parties should pay one-half of all work or

school related child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
minor children.
13 - The Court finds that the Petitioner brought certain
real property into the marriage, which property is referred to as
the farm or peach farm, together with 13 water shares. With
relation to such property, the Court finds:
A.

That the funds used to purchase the farm are

traceable from Petitioner's previous marriage settlement;
Petitioner has kept the property solely in his name, except for
those parcels which were sold or traded, the proceeds of which
were comingled; the remaining property known as the peach farm
has not been co-mingled;
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B.

The Petitioner originally paid $240,000 irom

premarital assets for the farm and water shares and there has
been no substantial increase in the value of the property; any
appreciation in the value of the property is due to market
forces; the present value of the farm is essentially the same as
when purchased when reduced by the outstanding debt owing thereon
and the parcels sold.
C.

The Respondent has made no significant contribution

to the farm which has resulted in any enhancement of value;
D.

The documentation or evidence presented by

Respondent does not reflect sufficient effort on her part so as
to cause an increase in the value of the property;
E-

The Court believed the testimony of the water

master and the receipts for the purchase of the trees and this
evidence did not support Respondent' s claim to have contributed
significant effort on the farm;
F.

The peach farm and water shares described as:

City of Moab County of Grand all of PLAT A & B,
BALLARD SUBDIVISION
are Petitioner's premarital property and should not be included
as marital assets;
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G,

Petitioner is obligated to pay the debt owing on

the peach farm as premarital debt.
14.

The Court finds that the marital residence has a value

of $220,000.
15.

The Court finds that the ranch property of

appiroximately 134 acres which is located on the LaSal Mountains
has a value of $1500 per acre, based in part upon the sale of
subdivided lots sold from the original parcel; the cabin is
valued at $60,000,
16.

The Court finds that Grand Valley Construction has a

value of $120,000.
17.

The Court finds that the total marital assets have a

value of $600,000.
18.

The Court finds that the marital debts and obligations

of the parties are as follows:

Home
Business Uanch
Improvement lien
Bonneville
Frontier
Tax Lien
Credit Cards
Eldon Ray Judgment
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$160,000
0
84,000
9,000
2,190
4,973
2,793
7,000
12,164

19.

The Court finds that the total marital debt is

$282,000.
20.

The Court finds that the parties have net assets to be

distributed of $318,000,
21.

The Court finds that each party is entitled to $159,000

in marital assets.
22.

The Court finds that the Respondent is entitled to the

marital residence and the $60,000 equity in said residence.

She

shall be responsible for payment of the property tax and
insurance on the home23-

The Court finds that the Respondent is entitled to an

additional $99,000 in marital assets;
24.

The Court finds that the Petitioner has offered to pay

an additional $10,000 to Respondent if the LaSal property is left
intact.
25.

The Petitioner should be ordered to pay to Respondent

as a marriage settlement the sum of $110,000 to be paid within 18
months from November 28, 2001 with no interest; the marriage
settlement shall be reduced by the amount of the house payments
made by Petitioner as set forth below.
26.

The Petitioner should pay the house payment until such

time as the entire marriage settlement is paid in full.
7

27.

The Court finds that the division of personal property

as set forth by the parties is reasonable. As no values were
placed upon the individual items, the Court finds that the
division is equal in monetary terras. The personal property shall
be divided as follows:
A.

Petitioner shall receive the following:

Freezer
Chopping block
Pizza oven
Steak fryer
Fruit scales
Chief Joseph and Icabod Crane paintings
Egg carton
Porter Rockwell painting
One dutch oven
One-half of antique farm equipment
Blue tractor
Antique wagon
Oak table

Michael's gun cabinet
,22 r i f l e and shotgun
Petitioner's photographs
All construction t o o l s
Antique l i c e n c e plate c o l l e c t i o n
lantern
Pickup truck
B. The Respondent shall receive the following:
Home
One-half of antique farm equipment
Household furniture and furnishings acquired
during the marriage
Ford Explorer
4-wheeler
Camp Chef burner
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27.

In addition to the personal property to be awarded to

the Petitioner, he should be awarded all of the business assets
of Grand Valley Construction and the excavation business,
including all tools, equipment and machinery and any personal
property, including any of those items which are on the property
of Respondent's father.
27.

Petitioner shall be allowed to deduct the amount of

principal on each house payment from the marriage settlement.
28.

Respondent shall be responsible for making the house

payment when the Petitioner has paid the marriage settlement.
30.

The Petitioner should be awarded the ranch property and

cabin, free and clear of any claim of the Respondent, said
property is more particularly described as:
T283, R25E, SLBM
Section 10rE«E^E«SE^
Section llrWMNV^SW^B^SE^SW^W^SW^
Section 14rN3flSE}£NW?4^^

Excepting therefrom an undivided 3£ interest in all oil, gas,
and other minerals. Subject to all restrictions, easements,
and Rights-of-Way, however evidenced
29.

The Respondent may have a lien on the ranch property to

secure the payment of the marriage settlement and shall release
said lien when the entire amount, less the credit for the
principal portion of the house payments, has been paid in full.
9

30.

The Petitioner is entitled to the pickup truck and the

Respondent is entitled to the 4-wheeler, without any reduction to
either party's share of marital assets31.

Neither of the parties are entitled to attorney's fees.

32.

Ban Holyoak purchased two lots from the parties and has

paid for said lots.

The parties should be ordered to do whatever

is necessary and Treasonable to transfer title to the property or
to remove any encumbrances or liens either has placed upon the
property.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes and enters ±tsz
CONCLUSIONS OF LAM
1.

Petitioner is entitled to a Decree of Divorce, severing

the bonds of matrimony existing between the parties to become
final immediately upon entry of the same in the registry of
actions.
2.

Respondent should be awarded the care, custody and

control of the minor children, subject to Petitioner's right of
visitation.
3.

Petitioner should be ordered to pay child support in the

amount of 5756 per month for a period of 36 months, at which time
the support shall be recalculated based upon Respondent's current
10

income, being not less than minimum wage, or income imputed at
$1000 per month if she is not working,
4.

Petitioner should be ordered to pay alimony in the

amount of $750 per month for a period of 36 months, at which time
the alimony shall be reduced to $250 per month for an additional
3 6 months. Alimony in any amount shall cease at such time as the
Respondent remarries, cohabitares or dies, pursuant to U.C.A.
§30-3-3.5(8-9}.
5.

The parties should be ordered to pay one~half of all

medical, dental and like expenses incurred on behalf of the minor
children.
6.

The parties should be ordered to pay one-half of all

work or school related child care expenses.
7.

The Petitioner should be awarded the peach farm property

and 13 water shares as his premarital property, free and clear
from any claim of the Respondent.

Described as:

City of Mbab County of Grand all of FLAT A & B,
BALLARD SUBDIVISION

8.

The Respondent should be awarded the marital residence

and should be ordered to pay the property tax and insurance
incurred in connection with the home. At such time as the
marriage settlement set forth below is paid in full, the
11

Respondent shall also be responsible for making the house
payment.
9.

The Petitioner should be ordered to pay to Respondent a

marriage settlement in the amount of $110,000; said amount is to
be paid within 18 months from November 28, 2001.
10.

Petitioner should be ordered to pay the house payment

until such time as the marriage settlement is paid in full.
Petitioner shall be entitled to reduce the marriage settlement by
the principal portion of each house payment made.
11.

The Petitioner should be ordered to assume and

discharge the marital obligations to-wit: the obligation on the
ranch, the improvement lien, the obligations to Bonneville,
Frontier, the tax lien, the obligations on the credit cards and
the Eldon Ray Judgment.
12.

The personal property of the parties shall be divided

as set forth in the Findings of Fact.
13.

The Petitioner should be awarded all of the assets of

Grand Valley Construction and the excavation business, together
with all tools, equipment and machinery and including any of
those items which are on the property of Respondent's father,
free and clear of any claim of the Respondent.
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14.

The Petitioner should be awarded the ranch property

free and clear of any claim of the Respondent. Described as:
T28S, R25E, SLBM
Section 10:E«E«EfcSEK
Section

11:W3^NW^W^E^;SE^W^;W«SW^

Section JL4 zimSEXHVTbm&

Excepting therefrom an undivided M interest in all oil, gas,
and other minerals. Subject to all restrictions, easements,
and Rights-of-Way, however evidenced
15.

Neither party should be awarded attorney's fees.

16.

Each of the parties should be ordered to facilitate the

transfer of title to the various properties or to remove any
encumbrances or liens either has placed upon any of the property.
DATED this

day of December, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT JUDGE
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30-3-4.1

mitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the approval of the court.
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both
parties have attended the mandatory course described in
Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of
course completion to the court. The court may waive this
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of
the parties, if it determines course attendance and
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in
the best interest of the parties.
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held
before the court or the court commissioner as provided b}T
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's
affidavit.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied
for or is receiving public assistance, o r . t h e court have full
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree.
1997
30-3-4.1 t o 30-3-4.4.
30-3-5.

Repealed.

1990

D i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y — M a i n t e n a n c e a n d
h e a l t h c a r e of p a r t i e s a n d c h i l d r e n '— Divis i o n of d e b t s — C o u r t t o h a v e c o n t i n u i n g
jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time —
D e t e r m i n a t i o n of a l i m o n y — N o n m e r i t o r i o u s
p e t i t i o n for m o d i f i c a t i o n .
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the
following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical a n d dental expenses of
the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible
-for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of t h e parties contracted or incurred during
marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's divi. sion of debts, obligations, or liabilitiesand regarding
the parties' separate, current addresses; and
- ,
(ih> provisions for-the enforcement of these orders;
,,and ,
\ (d) provisions for - income withholding .in^accordahce
•with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may, include, in an-order determining child
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
portion of< child care^ expenses« i n c u r r e d ' on;3>ehalf of 'the
.dependent children, necessitated by t h e employment or training of the custodial parent* If the. court determines t h a t the
circumstances are appropriate and t h a t t h e dependent children rwQuld.be. adequately cared for,Jt m a y include an order
allowing t h e noncustodial parent to provide child care for the
dependent children, necessitated by t h e employment or .training of the custodial parent.
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(3) The court has contmuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is\
reasonable and necessary.
\
(4) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and
visitation rights of grandparents and other members of
the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an
order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace
officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation
schedule entered under this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or parenttime provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailmg party in that action, if the court
determines that the petition was without merit and not
asserted or defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a
parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a
grandparent or other member of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitatiori or parent-time
right has been previously granted by the court, the court may
award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney
fees and court costs incurred bv the prevailing party because
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
\isitationoi parent-time
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determming alimony
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
y*
(lii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
\
support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of
I
minor children requiring support;
I
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a busiI
ness owned or operated by the payor spouse; and
I
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contribI
uted to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by
I
r paying for education received by the payor spouse or
I
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the
I
marriage.
I
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in
1
determining alimony,
1
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the
I
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in
l
determining alimony in accordance 1 with , Subsection
\
(7)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and .equitable principles and may, in .its discretion, base
alimony on the standard of hying t h a t existed a t the time
of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children
have been conceived or born during the. marriage, the
court may consider the standard of living t h a t existed at
. the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances,
..attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of
.living, -M
(e) When a marriage of long duration .dissolves ,on the
threshold of a major change i n the income of one of the
spouses d u e to the collective efforts pfjboth, t h a t change
. shall be considered in dividing the marital property and
in ^determining the amount of alimony. • If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the
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efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short
duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived
or born during the marriage, the court may consider
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the
time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a
new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient t h a t did not exist at the time the decree was
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances t h a t justify t h a t action.
(hi) In determining alimony, the income of any
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (7).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent
spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer
than the number of years that the marriage existed
unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage
or death of t h a t former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony
shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to
the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party
paying alimony t h a t the former spouse is cohabitating with
another person.
2001
30-3-5.1.

P r o v i s i o n for i n c o m e w i t h h o l d i n g in child
s u p p o r t order.
Whenever a court enters an order for child support, it shall
include in the order a provision for withholding income as a
means of collecting child support as provided in Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
1997
30-3-5.2.

A l l e g a t i o n s of c h i l d a b u s e or child s e x u a l
abuse — Investigation.
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for
modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or
child sexual abuse is made, implicating either party, the court,
after making an inquiry, may order t h a t an investigation be
conducted by t h e Division of Child and Family Services within
the Department of H u m a n Services in accordance with Title
62A, Chapter 4a. A final award of custody or parent-time may
not be rendered until a report on that investigation, consistent
with Section 62A-4a-412, is received by the court. That investigation shall be conducted by the Division of Child and
Family Services within 30 days of the court's notice and
request for an investigation. In reviewing this report, the
court shall comply with Section 78-7-9.
2001
30-3-5.5,30-3-6.

Repealed.

1991,1993

30-3-10

30-3-7. W h e n d e c r e e b e c o m e s a b s o l u t e .
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute:
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered bv
the clerk in the register of actions if both the
have a child or children have completed atter
mandatory course for divorcing parents as
Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court waives
ment, on its own motion or on the motion c
parties, upon determination that course atte
completion are not necessary, appropriate, fe
the best interest of the parties;
(b) at the expiration of a period of time th
specifically designate, unless an appeal or otl
ings for review are pending; or
(c) when the court, before the decree becom
for sufficient cause otherwise orders.
(2) The court, upon application or on its own
good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a
period of time before the decree becomes absolute.
exceed six months from the signing and entry of the decree.
1994

30-3-7.5.

R e v o c a t i o n of d e a t h b e n e f i t s by d i v o r c e o r
annulment.
(1) Upon the entry of a decree of annulment or divorce on
and after May 3, 1999, any revocable beneficiary designation
contained in a then existing written contract owned by one
party that provides for the payment of any death benefit to the
other party is revoked. A death benefit prevented from passing
to a former spouse by this section shall be paid as if the former
spouse had predeceased the decedent. The payor of any death
benefit shall be discharged from all liability upon payment in
accordance with the terms of the contract providing for the
death benefit, unless the payor receives written notice of the
entry of decree under this section prior to payment.
(2) The term "death benefit" includes any payments under a
life insurance contract, annuity, qualified retirement plan or
individual retirement, compensation agreement, or other contract designating a beneficiary of any right, property, or money
in the form of a death benefit.
(3) This section does not apply;
(a) to the extent a decree of annulment or divorce from
the bond of matrimony, or a written agreement of the
parties provides for a contrary result as to specific death
benefits; or
(b) to any trust or any death benefit payable to or under
any trust.
1999
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful.
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their
marriage by decree may marry any person other than the
spouse from whom the divorce was granted until it becomes
absolute. If an appeal is taken, the divorce is not absolute until
after affirmance of the decree.
1988
30-3-9.
30-3-10.

Repealed.

1969

Custody of children in c a s e of s e p a r a t i o n o r
d i v o r c e — Custody c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court
shall make an order for the future care and custody of the
minor children as it considers appropriate.
(a) In determining custody, the court shall consider the
best interests of the child and the past conduct and
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties.
(b) The children may not be required by either party to
testify unless the trier of fact determines t h a t extenuating
circumstances exist that would necessitate the testimony
of the children be heard and there is no other reasonable
method to present their testimony.

